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Implications of Amending Civil Code Article 2315 on Toxic
Torts in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION
During its 1999 session, the Louisiana Legislature amended and re-enacted
Civil Code article 2315,' which is sometimes referred to as the "fountainhead" of
tort law in Louisiana.2 The revised article contains a new provision, which states:
Damages do not include costs for future medical treatment, services,
surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless such treatment, services,
surveillance, or procedures are directly related to a manifest physical or
mental injury or disease.'
The legislature explained its intent in passing the amended article by stating that the
Act is "interpretative of Civil Code article 2315" and explains its "original intent,"4
notwithstanding the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Bourgeois v. A.P.
Green Industries, Inc.' In Bourgeois, the court recognized medical monitoring as
a type of damages recoverable under Civil Code article 2315.6 The revision seems
clearly aimed at eliminating medical monitoring as a viable element of damages
recoverable in Louisiana. The legislature's anticipated ends, however, may not
match its perceivable means.
This comment will focus on the development of medical monitoring claims,
specifically in toxic tort law, nationally and in Louisiana under the previous Civil
Code article 2315. Further, it will discuss the actual language of the amended
article and the future impact of the 1999 revision on medical monitoring claims
under Louisiana law. Finally, it will show that under certain circumstances, a claim
for medical monitoring is still possible despite the legislature's attempt to exclude
it as a form of recovery for plaintiffs.
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I. The prior version of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 (1986) states:
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it
happens to repair it.
Damages may Include loss of consortium, service, and society, and shall be recoverable
by the same respective categories of persons who would have a cause of action for wrongful
death of an injured person.
2. Frank L Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and the
Changing Face ofLouisiana Tort Law, 71 Tul. L Rev. 339, 342 (1996).
3. See 1999 La. Acts No. 989, §1.
4. d.
5. 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998).
6. Id. at 360.
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II. A BRmF LOOK AT Toxic TORTS IN LOUISIANA AND NATIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE
Generally, "toxic tort" litigation encompasses a broad array of cases that stem
from the release of and exposure to substances containing harmful toxins."
Damages may consist of personal injuries, both physical and mental, and property
damage caused by exposure to substances such as asbestos, pesticides, hazardous
waste, radiation, and chemical compounds.8 A unique characteristic of toxic tort
personal injury cases is the absence of traumatic injury to the victim. Instead,
exposure to toxins generally leads to diseases of "uncertain etiology," often
associated with long latency periods and various symptomatic difficulties such as
allergies, fatigue, dizziness, cramping, learning disabilities, and cardiac problems.'
The toxic tort arena is replete with potential problems for attorneys and the courts.
Issues such as proof problems (including lost evidence and background disease),
class certification in class action suits,'0 and admission of expert or medical
testimony" are common. The most difficult of these problems is that of proving
causation. 2
A. Causation
In an ordinary tort case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the causal
connection between the defendant's product and the resulting injury. However, in
toxic tort cases, proof of causation rarely consists of a "direct explanation of a
causal process." 13 The scientific community does not yet fully comprehend the
biological mechanisms that produce birth defects and illnesses, such as the cancers
and auto-immune diseases for which plaintiffs seek compensation after exposure. 4
In addition, exposure to the defendant's products often cannot be shown to be a
necessary cause of the particular disease." In most instances, the adverse health
effects for which plaintiffs seek compensation are also found in others who have
not been exposed to the substance or product in question. Because this
"background" rate exists, it is almost impossible to tell whether any individual
7. Carol E. Dinkins & Arthur E. Murphy, Toxic Tons, 6 Bus. & Corn. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 80.9
(1998).
8. Id.
9. Joseph C. Kearfott & D. Alan Rubin, Toxic Tort Litigation at the Millennium, SD67 ALI-
ABA 35,63 (1999).
10. Charles W. Schwartz & Lewis C. Sutherland, Class Certification for Environmental and
Toxic Tort Claims, SD67 AL-ABA 117 (1999).
II. J. Michael Vernon. The Trial of Toxic Tons: Scientific Evidence in the Wake of Daubert,
57 La. L Rev. 647 (1997).
12. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Tons, 97 Colum. L Rev. 2117 (1997).
13. Id. at 2121.
14. Id.
15. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Tons, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After Daubert. 55
U. Pitt. L Rev. 889, 896 (1994).
[Vol. 60
COMMENTS
plaintiff's injury is attributable to the exposure or whether it would have
manifested itself even absent the exposure.' 6  Therefore, plaintiffs are often
required to produce scientific evidence from which a probability based inference
can be drawn. They attempt to show the substance in question is capable of
causing the health effects suffered and then establish that the exposure to the
defendant's product is the cause of their injury."
B. Evidentiary Problems
"Because causation is an essential element of liability, evidentiary disputes
relating to proof of general causation are often the most hotly contested issues in
toxic tort litigation."" Plaintiffs often have to rely on scientific evidence to prove
a causal connection between the exposure and injury. Epidemiological and non-
traditional evidence have become the primary sources of proof by plaintiffs and
defendants trying to prove, or refute, a "legally cognizable relationship between the
substance and the injury claimed."' 9 Statistical comparisons between exposed and
unexposed populations having a particular disease, or comparisons of
characteristics of persons having a particular disease with those of persons without
that disease, are commonly employed evidentiary techniques in toxic tort
litigation." This confluence of law and science led to some debate over the
admissibility of what some call "junk science," a phrase used to describe novel or
unsubstantiated scientific theories often used to confuse courts and persuadejuries.
This issue was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.21 In Daubert, the Court articulated the
standard for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. The Court listed
several factors that a trial court should examine to determine whether a scientific
expert's testimony rests on a reliable foundation.' The Court emphasized that the
inquiry envisioned by Federal Rule of Evidence 702' is a "flexible one."'
However, in a phrase commonly repeated by courts in the wake of Daubert, the
Supreme Court stated that federal trial courts are to serve as "gatekeepers" to
16. Berger, supra note 12, at 2122.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Eggen, supra note 15, at 898.
20. id.
21. 509 U.S. 579. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
22. These factors included empirical testing of the scientific theory or technique, subjecting the
scientific theory or technique to peer review and publication, the known or potential error rate of the
particular scientific technique, and the acceptability of the technique in the relevant scientific
community. Id. at 593-94. 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
23. Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
24. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
2000]
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ensure that scientific evidence is both relevant and reliable.2 Louisiana has
followed the Supreme Court's lead by adopting this test as the appropriate standard
for admitting such evidence at the state level.'.
IM. MEDICAL MONITORING
The problems in developing a toxic tort case under a traditional tort analysis,
along with the significant number of claims that appear in this area as well as the
legislative silence on these issues, have forced courts in the United States to
develop and utilize new, novel causes of action." The remainder of this comment
will focus on these alternatives, specifically medical monitoring claims, a
jurisprudential creation which has gained wide acceptance during the past two
decades.
A. The Development of Medical Monitoring
A claim for "medical monitoring"' can be defined as a remedial mechanism
awarded to plaintiffs for recovery of periodic medical examinations used to detect
latent disease or disorder caused by the defendant's negligent conduct.29 The
objective is to foster early diagnosis and treatment for such diseases or disorders,
thus mitigating any possible damage to victims of exposure." This judicially-
created solution has gained wide acceptance over the past two decades, and many
courts are recognizing it as a valid, separate cause of action.3'
Although medical monitoring had been mentioned in several cases, 32 the
seminal case explicitly laying out the basis for recovery was Friends For All
25. See Dinkins & Murphy, supra note 7.
26. See State v. Fort, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
27. The main theories of recovery cited by the courts are medical monitoring, increased risk of
disease, and fear of contracting disease, including "cancerphobia."
28. This section will focus on medical monitoring claims being brought under state, not federal.
law. Toxic tort cases sometimes include claims under CERCLA. FELA. RCRA. OSHA, OPA, CWA.
CAA, or other federal statues. There have been some federal court decisions that would allow for
recovery of medical monitoring costs in limited situations. See. e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.. 755
F. Supp. 1468. 1474 (D. Colo. 199 1); Brewer v. Raven. 680 F. Supp. 1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
However, recent decisions have not recognized a cause of action to recover these costs for private
citizens under these laws. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424. 117
S. Ct. 2113 (1997); Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 P.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995);
Durfey v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir. 1995); Pritikin v. U.S. Dep't of Energy,
47 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. Wash. 1999).
29. Allan L Schwartz, Recovery of Damages for Expense of Medical Monitoring to Detect or
Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R. 5th 327, 340 (1994).
30. Id.
31. See Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall
for Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 Hous. L Rev. 473, 489-90 n.100 (1996), for a thorough list of states that have
recognized medical monitoring through 1996.
32. See, e.g., Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369. 1376 (IlI. App. Ct. 1979).
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Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.3 Interestingly, this case did not involve
a toxic tort. Instead, the litigation arose out of the crash of a Lockheed aircraft
attempting to evacuate Vietnamese orphans from Saigon in 1975.' Although the
court denied recovery for the victims' increased risk of serious brain damage,35 it
did recognize medical monitoring as a valid theory of recovery in the District of
Columbia. The court required the defendants to pay money into a court-supervised
fund that was to be used to pay for future diagnostic examinations for the
plaintiffs.m The decision was grounded on "equitable principles," thus failing to
articulate a workable standard for subsequent cases to follow.37
Numerous jurisdictions, both state and federal, have followed the groundwork
laid by Lockheed Aircraft.3' Despite the widespread acceptance of medical
monitoring as a valid theory of recovery, courts around the country have varied as
to the requisite degree of injury needed before recovery is allowed. 9 Some courts
have required a showing of actual and present injury,"° while others have only
required proof of exposure before awarding damages.4' Likewise, a distinct set of
criteria that could be used to determine when recovery of monitoring costs is proper
remained absent following Lockheed Aircraft.
In 1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first court to articulate a
workable standard in awarding medical monitoring damages in the case of Ayers
v. Township of Jackson.' In Ayers, the plaintiffs brought suit to recover damages
for injuries sustained from drinking well water that was contaminated by pollutants
from the defendant's landfill."3 No specific illness or disease resulting from the
exposure was alleged, but the plaintiffs did seek recovery for medical monitoring
expenses." In granting the plaintiffs a substantial recovery for medical
surveillance costs,' the court identified criteria that needed to be met before this
compensation could be awarded. These requirements included: (1) a significant
and extended exposure to chemicals, (2) toxicity of the chemicals, (3) seriousness
33. 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
34. Id. at 818. The plaintiffs in this case were a group claiming to be the legal guardians of the
Vietnamese orphans injured in the accidenL They alleged that, as a result of the crash and
decompression of the troop compartment, the children suffered from a neurological disorder referred
to as Minimal Brain Dysfunction C'MBD"). Id. at 819.
35. Id. at 826.
36. 14 at 838.
37. Id.
38. See supra note 3 1.
39. Jordan, supra note 3 1, at 488-89.
40. See, e.g., Ball v. Joy Technologies. Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991). The Fourth Circuit,
applying West Virginia and Virginia state law, held that exposure without a physical injury is
insufficient to recover medical monitoring damages. Id. at 39. See also, Mergenthaler v. Asbestos
Corp. of Am., 480 A.2d 647 (Del. 1984).
41. Jordan. supra note 31, at 488.89.
42. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
43. Id. at 291.
44. Id. at 292.




of the disease for which the plaintiffs are at risk, (4) a relative increase in chance
of onset of the disease in those exposed, and (5) a showing of the value of early
detection.'
Six years later, the Utah Supreme Court added to the Ayers factors in Hansen
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.' In Hansen, the court listed eight requirements that
a plaintiff must prove to recover monitoring costs:
(1) exposure
(2) to a toxic substance,
(3) which exposure was caused by the defendant's negligence,
(4) resulting in an increased risk
(5) of a serious disease, illness, or injury
(6) for which a medical test for early detection exists
(7) and for which early detection is beneficial, meaning that a treatment exists
that can alter the course of the illness,
(8) and which test has been prescribed by a qualified physician according
contemporary scientific principles."
Furthermore, the court stated that proof of these elements usually requires
expert testimony.'9 The sole difference between this test and the Ayers test is the
requirement of an increased risk of contracting a disease or illness.
B. Medical Monitoring Under Louisiana Law
Louisiana was relatively late in joining other states in recognizing medical
monitoring as a valid theory of recovery. Although some appellate courts allowed
for this type of recovery in certain cases," it remained unclear if the medical
monitoring was an independent legal harm or merely an element of damages. This
potential dichotomy was eradicated in 1998 with the Louisiana Supreme Court's
ruling in Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Industries, Inc."1 In Bourgeois, the plaintiffs
filed a class action in which they alleged that the defendants had negligently
exposed them to products containing asbestos.5 2 They sought a judgment to
establish a judicially-administered fund to cover the costs of periodic medical
monitoring.53 The court, after reviewing the law in Louisiana and other states, held
that the reasonable costs of medical monitoring was a "compensable item under
Civil Code article 2315.' 4 Relying heavily on the Utah Supreme Court's decision
46. Ayers. 525 A.2d at 312.
47. 858 P.2d 970 (Utah 1993).
48. Id. at 979.
49. Id. at 979 n.10.
50. See, e.g., Manuel v. Shell Oil Co., 664 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Jeffery v. Thibaut
Oil Co., 652 So. 2d 1021 (La. App. 5th Cir 1995).
51. 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998).
52. Id. at 356.
53. Id. at 357.
54. Id. at 360.
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in Hansen, the court articulated seven criteria that must be met in order for a
plaintiff to recover monitoring costs. These requirements include:
(1) Significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance;
(2) As a proximate result of this exposure, plaintiff suffers a significantly
increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease;
(3) Plaintiff's risk of contracting a serious latent disease is greater than (a) the
risk of contracting the same disease had he or she not been exposed and
(b) the chances of members of the public at large of developing the
disease;
(4) A monitoring procedure exists that makes the early detection of the
disease possible;
(5) The monitoring procedure has been prescribed by a qualified physician
and is reasonably necessary according to contemporary scientific
principles;
(6) The prescribed monitoring regime is different from that normally
recommended in the absence of exposure; and
(7) There is some demonstrated clinical value in the early detection and
diagnosis of the disease.'-
In following the national trend to recognize medical monitoring as an
independent, compensable harm, the court made a clear policy decision in line with
that expressed in Lockheed Aircraft and Hansen.
C. Policy Concerns in Awarding Medical Monitoring Damages
Despite their growing acceptance throughout the country, medical monitoring
claims have been the subject of some criticism in both the courts and legal
commentaries. In 1997, the United States Supreme Court expressed its concern in
recognizing tort actions in the form of medical monitoring in Metro-North
Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley.5' In Buckley, the Court rejected the plaintiff's
claim for medical monitoring damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA). It held that these claims were premature until the plaintiff manifests
symptoms of a disease or injury.57 In the opinion, the Court addressed several
policy concerns which accompany medical monitoring claims. First, the Court
articulated the difficulty for judges and juries in identifying which medical tests are
needed to detect exposure related diseases. 8 Second, it noted the possibility of a
flood of litigation and "unlimited and unpredictable liability" for defendants if
medical monitoring claims are allowed without proof of an injury.59 Finally, the
Court expressed the need to explore alternative sources of payment, so-called
55. Id. at 360-62.
56. 521U.S. 424, 117 S. Ct. 2113(1997).
57. It should be noted that the plaintiff in this case was seeking a lump-sum award for future
medical costs, a possibility criticized by many courts which allowed medical monitoring claims without
a present injury. See id. at 440-41, 117 S. Ct. at 2122.
58. Id. at 441. 117 S. Ct. at 2123.
59. Id. at442, 117 S. Ct. at 2123.
COMMENTS20001
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"collateral sources" from employers or insurance, instead of recognizing a
"traditional, full-blown ordinary tort liability rule." 
°
Although the Louisiana standard articulated in the Bourgeois decision
addressed some of these concerns, several questions remained unanswered. The
first of these problems was the method of awarding medical monitoring damages
under Louisiana law. 6 Generally, medical monitoring damages can be recoyered
in several ways. The two most common types of awards are lump-sum payments
to offset future medical costs, and judicially-administered funds which compensate
plaintiffs only for those costs actually incurred. Each of these awards does have
potential problems. With a lump sum award, plaintiffs can spend their award as
they see fit, without any obligation that it be used for its intended purpose.' "Mass
exposure toxic tort cases involve public interests not present in conventional tort
litigation," namely the encouragement of regular monitoring for victims of toxic
exposure.' Some restrictions on the use of money paid to plaintiffs seem
necessary to help achieve this goal." A possible solution to this problem is
judicially administered or supervised funds. Under this system, courts would be
responsible for administering medical surveillance payments to compensate for
medical examinations and tests actually administered.' The drawback to this
method of disbursement is that it could potentially require the courts to perform a
much more active role in the litigation, even years after the conflict has been
settled.
Another potential problem left unresolved after the Bourgeois decision was the
quantification of the criteria listed by the court. For example, the court required
"significant exposure to a proven hazardous substance." This begs the question:
How much exposure is "significant"? Furthermore, how much of an increase is a
"significantly increased risk"? The opinion does not offer any workable standards
or solutions. It seems self-evident that the vagueness of the word "significant," in
either context, would lead to a great deal of litigation. Some sort of objective
criteria is needed to aid courts in determining what "significant" entails.
Finally, as a practical matter, insurance coverage for persons producing or
handling potentially harmful substances becomes extremely difficult to calculate
if one must factor in the possibility of paying future medical bills of potential
plaintiffs for years to come. One commentator writes,
The number of persons who may be exposed to the risk of injury or
property damage by an environmental hazard is far less determinate than
the number that actually suffer injury; the amount of compensation that
60. The Court cited 29 CFR § 1910.1001(l)(1996), which requires employers to provide medical
monitoring for workers exposed to asbestos, as an example. Id. at 443, 117 S. Ct. at 2123.
61. Although the Buckley court addressed this problem directly, the Bourgeois court avoided this
issue because the plaintiffs asked specifically for a court- supervised fund. It chose not address whether
a lump-sum award of damages is recoverable under Louisiana law. Bourgeois, 716 So. 2d at 357 n.3.
62. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d. 795, 825 n.28 (Cal. 1993).
63. Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d. 287, 314 (N.J. 1987).
64. Id.
65. /d. at 313-14.
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would be awarded on a risk-only basis would be uncertain and probably
unstable for a long period; and refuting claims of risk exposure would be
difficult and expensive for insurers defending against such claims."
Potential liability for medical monitoring costs may be sufficiently "open-ended"
to further uncertainty in this market.'7IOn the same token, some commentators have suggested that medical
monitoring costs may be unnecessary for plaintiffs with adequate health coverage."8
If a plaintiff's monitoring costs are already covered by an individual or employer's
health plan, there is a question of whether the "collateral source rule" will apply."
Under this rule, plaintiffs receiving benefits from health or medical insurance,
disability insurance, workers' compensation, or government benefits are not
deducted from the amount owed by the tortfeasor because these payments were not
supplied by that party.7" This may allow for double recovery in some
circumstances.7
IV. REviSiNG LOUISIANA LAW WITH REGARD TO MEDICAL MoNrrORING
Only one year after the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Bourgeois, the
Louisiana Legislature felt it necessary to address the issue of medical monitoring
directly. The policy concerns, seen in Part III of this comment, certainly seem to
be the controlling factors leading to amending Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
In order to analyze how the amended article will, affect the rulings of Louisiana
courts in this area, a detailed examination of the added language is necessary.
A. The Revised Language of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315
The new provision of Article 2315 addresses only the award of a specific type
of damages. The added language to the statute reads:
Damages do not include costs for future medical treatment, services,
surveillance, or procedures of any kind unless such treatment, services,
surveillance, or procedures are directly related to a manifest physical or
mental injury or disease.7
66. Kenneth S. Abraham. Environmental Liability and the Limlis of Insurance,
88 Colum. L Rev. 942, 973 (1988).
67. Id.
68. See Susan L Matrin &Jonathon D. Martin, TortActionsforMedicalMonitoring: Warranted
or Wasteful?. 20 Colum. J. Envti. L 121. 138 (1995).
69. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 Wake Forest
L Rev. 1057, 1078 (1999).
70. Id.
71. Double recovery can be avoided by health insurers in some cases by providing that the insurer
is to be subrogated to the insured's tort claim. See John W. Wade et al., Prosser, Wade. and Schwartz's
Cases and Materials on Torts 522 (9th ed. 1994).
72. See 1999 La. Acts No. 989.
20001
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Therefore, the issues of causation, admission of expert or medical testimony, and
problems of proof including long latency periods, lost evidence, and background
disease, remain in accordance with prior jurisprudence. The amendment only
excludes recovery of costs for "future medical treatment, services, surveillance, or
procedures." This language seems to be referring to a pure medical monitoring
recovery, one that does not include any actual injury. In Bourgeois, the supreme
court did not require any physical or mental injury to be present in order for a
plaintiff to recover medical monitoring costs. Plaintiffs were required to show an
"increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease," but not actual injury.73
Furthermore, the court failed to define this increased risk requirement with any
specificity. 74 The wording of the new provision seems to be speaking directly to
this decision, barring medical monitoring as a separate theory of recovery in the
absence of manifest physical or mental injury.
However, the second part of the article does provide an exception to this
general rule. Future monitoring costs can still be recovered if plaintiffs can show
that these costs are "directly related to a manifest physical or mental injury or
disease."7' The main issue in these cases now becomes: What must plaintiffs show
to satisfy the requirement of a "manifest physical or mental injury or disease"?
One possible interpretation of the statute is to construe the language strictly,
limiting recovery only to injuries that physically "manifest" themselves
immediately after exposure. Physical harm, such as dermal, muscular,
neurological, or circulatory damage, would be sufficient to allow for future
monitoring. A factual scenario, as seen in Anderson v. Welding Testing
Laboratory, Inc., " helps to illustrate this result. In Anderson, the plaintiff suffered
burns from handling a radioactive "pill" on the defendant's premises." At the time
of suit, Mr. Anderson did not have any sickness that could be attributed to his
injury. Under the Bourgeois rationale, he would be able to recover for future
medical costs to monitor his condition because the material he handled was known
to cause cancer.7 Likewise, under the revision, this exposure and the resulting
injury would allow him to recover these costs. Without an actual physical injury,
however, the anxiety, mental anguish, or symptomatic problems suffered by the
plaintiff might be inadequate to allow for recovery of future monitoring expenses.79
This conclusion leads to harsh results.
73. Bourgeois v. A .P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 360 (La. 1998).
74. Id.
75. It is interesting to note that in the original version of the bill, the word "reasonably" was used
instead of "directly." See H.B. 1784, Reg. Sess. (La. 1999).
76. 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974).
77. Id. at 352.
78. Id. at 353.
79. This interpretation would be consistent with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ball v. Joy
Technologies. Inc., 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991). See supra text accompanying note 39. It should be
noted that the West Virginia Supreme Court declined to follow this interpretation of West Virginia law
by the Fourth Circuit. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W.Va. 1999).
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B. Alternative Causes of Action to Mitigate a Narrow Interpretation of the
Revised Article
Diseases such as cancer, which may result from exposure to toxic substances,
often have long latency periods and may not develop until years after exposure.
Under a narrow interpretation of the revision, a victim who is exposed to potential
toxins, without developing any immediate disease or injury from the exposure, will
have no recourse against the malefactor until he suffers an injury or manifests an
illness. At that time, it is often too late to abate the disease or injury. In order to
monitor for such disease or injury, the victim in these cases would be forced to pay
for expensive diagnostic examinations, leading to potential injustice for
economically disadvantaged persons.' These tests could ensue for many years and
cost the victim thousands of dollars before any disease is actually found. The lack
of reimbursement would certainly deter some individuals from seeking regular
medical surveillance, eliminating the beneficial effects of early detection and
mitigation of serious future disease."s
One might also inquire into problems with statutes of limitation. Generally,
the plaintiff has a time limit in which to bring suit for his or her exposure caused
by the negligence of the defendant. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
adopted the "discovery" rule in Corsey v. State Department of Corrections.2 This
doctrine delays the conunencement of prescription until the plaintiff discovers or
should discover his injury.83 Therefore, plaintiffs can wait until they actually
contract a disease or injury before filing suit. Again, this does not offer much of
a solution for exposure victims. First, the time period between exposure and
disease may be many years, leading to evidentiary difficulties and possibly
insolvent defendants. Second, as previously discussed, interim medical costs will
have to be borne by victims, not the malefactors. Equity would seem to mandate
that the negligent defendants be the ones to pay for these expenses, rather than the
victims of the exposure.
Another consequence from a limited interpretation of the revised article is the
possibility of courts recognizing and utilizing more novel causes of action to
equitably compensate plaintiffs for exposure to potentially harmful substances.
The two leading candidates to replace medical monitoring as the preferred method
of recovery are increased risk of disease and fear of contraction.
1. Increased Risk of Disease
In increased risk cases, "plaintiffs who have no physical symptoms of disease,
or who suffer from illness that may be the precursor to a second, more serious
illness, seek to recover for the future risk of contracting the illness or disease.""
80. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dept. of the Army, 696 A.2d. 137, 145 (Pa. 1997).
81. Ayers, 525 A.2d. at 311-12.
82. 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
83. id. at 1328.
84. Eggen, supra note 15, at 905.
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Recovery for enhanced risk of disease is permitted in many states. However, the
general rule is that a plaintiff must prove that the toxic exposure more probably
than not will lead to the disease." This rule can be seen in Rabb v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., Inc."6 In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim for increased risk of
disease, the Rabb court noted that the plaintiffs had failed to "offer testimony
precisely identifying the diseases for which they were allegedly at risk.""7
Furthermore, citing South Carolina law, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to
establish that they "most probably" would suffer from any of the unspecified
diseases that they claimed might be suffered from in the future."
Consistent with Rabb, other courts have denied relief for the increased risk of
contracting future injuries that have less than a reasonable probability of
occurring,s9 but they have enunciated the standard in different ways. Some courts
require plaintiffs to show a "reasonable certainty" that the plaintiff will develop the
illness. ' Others require a showing of a "reasonable medical probability" that they
will develop the illness.9' These standards all seem to require that the plaintiff must
present expert testimony that he has more than a fifty-percent chance of contracting
the particular disease.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court has remained silent on the subject of whether
increased risk is a valid, independent harm under Louisiana law. However, the
court did use increased risk as a prerequisite before awarding medical monitoring
under Bourgeois. 3 Several Fifth Circuit cases have indicated that recovery for ini-
creased risk is possible, but have set a very high burden of proof for such claims.9
85. See Dinkins & Murphy, supra note 7.
86. 677 P. Supp. 424 (D. S.C. 1987).
87. Id. at426n.1.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Aznader v. Johns-Manville Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Bennett v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176, 106 S. Ct. 2903
(1986); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
90. See, e.g.. Stites v. Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1516, 1523 (W.D. Mich.
1987); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1231 (D. Mass. 1986); Bennett v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854,866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1176, 106 S. Ct.
2903 (1986); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376 (11. App. Ct. 1979).
91. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589,591-92 (5th Cir. 1986); Dartez
v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456,466 (5th Cit. 1985); Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495,
499-501 (N.J. 1986).
92. But see, e.g., McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (three to
twenty-five percent chance of future epilepsy); Feistv. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d 675, 679 (Or.
1973) (chance of future meningitis "no more than a possibility"); Schwegel v. Goldberg, 228 A.2d 405,
409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (five percent chance of future epilepsy). It should be noted that each of these
cases dealt with increased risk of injuries resulting from physical trauma, e.g. head injuries, not
exposure to toxic materials. Their application may be limited to their facts in that respect.
93. Bourgeois v. A. P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355.360 (La. 1998).
94. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc.. 788 F.2d 315.318(5th Cir. 1986) (a plaintiff
can recover only where he can show that the toxic exposure more probably than not will lead to cancer);
Adams v. Johns.Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589,591-92 (5th Cit. 1986) (damages can be awarded
only when sufficient evidence is presented that the plaintiff will develop cancer within a reasonable
probability).
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Commentators have heavily debated both sides of the issue," but the decision to
recognize increased risk still remains to be determined by the high court of
Louisiana.
2. Fear of Contracting Disease
Under this theory of recovery, the plaintiff seeks compensation for the
emotional distress caused by the fear or knowledge that he or she may some day
contract disease as a result of the exposure to toxic substances. Many courts
characterize claims of this type as claims for either negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress." Furthermore, as is the case with increased risk
claims, courts differ on the applicable criteria in granting this type of relief. Most
courts require some variation of the following:
(1) Plaintiff was exposed to a disease-causing agent or substance;
(2) Defendant is legally responsible for plaintiff's exposure to the disease-
causing agent or substance;
(3) Plaintiff is currently suffering, or has suffered, from emotional distress
associated with the fear of contracting a future disease;
(4) The fear was proximately caused by exposure to a disease-causing agent
or substance; and
(5) Plaintiff's fear of contracting the disease from the exposure is
reasonable."
In addressing fear of contraction claims, some jurisdictions apply a "rational
basis" test, in which the plaintiff must prove the existence of real danger of
contracting the disease as a prerequisite for recovering mental distress damages."
The rational basis test is more favorable to the defendant because the plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the environmental exposure in question poses an actual
risk to his or her health."
95. See Keith W. Lapeze, Comment. Recovery for Increased Risk of Disease in Louisiana, 58
La. L Rev. 249 (1997) (advocating increased risk as a separate, compensable harm in Louisiana). But
see also, David P. C. Ashton, Comment, Decreasing the Risks Inherent in Claims for Increased Risk
of Future Disease, 43 U. Miami L Rev. 1081 (1989) (calling increased risk a "phantom remedy"
because of the difficulty of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence).
96. Carol E. Dinkins & Lewis C. Sutherland. Overview: Recent Trends and Developments in
Environmental and Toxic Tort Uitigation, SB73 ALJ-ABA 261,280 (1997).
97. See, e.g., Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. 1985); Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958).
98. See, e.g., Sterlingv. VelsicolChemicalCorp., 855 F.2d 1188(6thCir. 1988); Hagertyv. IAL
Marine Services. Inc. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986); Plummer v. United States, 580 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.
1978); Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hospital, Inc., 217 N.W.2d 383 (Wis. 1974). affidon reh'g, 219 N.W.2d
576 (Wis. 1974).
99. Martha A. Churchill. Toxic Torts: Proof of Medical Monitoring Damages for Exposure to
Toxic Substances, 25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 313 (1994).
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Another test used in some jurisdictions is the "reasonable fear" test."1" The
"reasonable fear" test is based on community standards rather than scientific
reality."0 ' The plaintiff's fear is considered reasonable so long as the jurors, as
representatives of the community, perceive the danger as legitimate. The
"reasonable fear" test is advantageous to the plaintiff since it does not require proof
of an actual risk."2
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court has found that the fear of contracting
a disease is a compensable harm under Louisiana law, 3 it has yet to offer a
definitive standard by which these damages can be recovered. Lower courts have
followed modifications of both the "rational basis" and "reasonable fear" tests.
The Fifth Circuit, however, delineated a standard for these claims in Hagerty v. L
& L Marine Services, Inc.'"M In Hagerty, the court listed three elements required
to recover for fear of contracting a disease: (I) a fear that is causally related to the
defendant's negligence; (2) the fear must be reasonable; and (3) there must be an
actionable injury." 5 Although this was a federal question, decided by the Fifth
Circuit, it has been cited with approval by numerous Louisiana courts."
In its opinion in Vallier v. Louisiana Health Systems,t"o the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal applied a fact-based test to see if a victim exposed to HIV
could recover for emotional distress without a physical injury. The court applied
Moresi v. State Department of Wildlife & Fisheries,'' which held that an emotional
distress action without physical injury must present the "especial likelihood of
genuine and serious mental distress, arising from special circumstances, which
serves as a guarantee that the claims is not spurious.""' 9 Because the factual
circumstances in the case were such that the plaintiff's distress was reasonable, she
was able to proceed with her suit on remand. This case, in utilizing Moresi,
presents somewhat of an objective standard in deciding the validity of emotional
distress actions, and could be extended to most fear of disease cases by courts in
the future.
100. See Fenara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958) (reasonable to fear cancer because of
trauma despite lack of testimony to prove that point); Johnson v. West Virginia Univ. Hosp.. Inc., 413
S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991) (reasonable to fear AIDS without proving likelihood of infection).
101. Churchill, iupra note 99, at 327.
102. Id.
103. See Anderson v. Welding Testing Laboratories, Inc., 304 So. 2d 351 (La. 1974).
104. 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
105. d. at 318.
106. See Smith v. A.C. & S. Inc., 843 F.2d 854, 858 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Hageny with
approval); Johnson v. Armstrong Cork Co., 645 F. Supp. 764,769 (W.D. La. 1986) (same); Coffin v.
Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 620 So. 2d 1354, 1364 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (same).
107. 722 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1998), writ denied, 738 So. 2d 587 (1999).
108. 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990).
109. Vallier, 722 So. 2d at 420.
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3. Lilley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
As stated above, Louisiana courts have begun to allow recovery for such
claims as fear of contraction and increased risk of disease. The lack of clear
standards seems to render these causes of action attractive to sympathetic courts
and juries. Recently, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided the case
of Lilley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University."' The plaintiffs,
a group of firemen exposed to asbestosis at the defendants' facility, sued to recover
for the fear of contracting cancer as a result of their exposure, as well as future
costs of medical monitoring. The defendant was found liable, and the trial court
awarded both damages for emotional distress related to the exposure and future
medical monitoring expenses."'
On appeal, the third circuit upheld the award of compensatory damages for
fear of contracting asbestiosis or other related diseases, but reversed the award of
medical monitoring damages. In the decision, the court held that the exposure
itself, along with an "increased concern" about their health, was a sufficient injury
suffered by the firemen to justify damages for fear of contraction." However, it
overturned the medical monitoring award because of the plaintiff s failure to show
a "significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease," a
requirement under Bourgeois."3 The court, as it did in Vallier, stated that even
without a showing of physical injury, a claim for mental distress arising from
asbestos exposure is "one that carries an especial likelihood of genuine and serious
mental distress. . . ,," However, the medical monitoring claim was reversed
because the plaintiffs failed to show evidence that there was a significant increase
in their risk of contracting a disease. The court noted that, "compensable mental
injuries do not necessarily have to coexist with a proven need for medical
monitoring.,,. s
The Lilley decision is significant because it was decided when medical
monitoring costs were available under Bourgeois without the requirement of
showing a "manifest physical or mental injury or disease." The Lilley court had
little problem in awarding damages for the plaintiffs' emotional distress caused by
their exposure to asbestos, but it felt compelled to strictly construe the requirements
of Bourgeois before allowing medical monitoring expenses. If the revision to
Article 2315 is interpreted narrowly, Louisiana courts possibly will begin to follow
this model and award monetary damages more liberally for causes of action such
110. 735 So. 2d 696 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 744 So. 2d 629 (1999).
111. The trial court divided the plaintiffs into three categories, depending on the amount of
exposure to which each individual plaintiff was subjected. Those plaintiffs with significant exposure
received $30,000 in compensatory damages, followed by $15,000 for plaintiffs with moderate exposure.
The plaintiffs with no direct contact with the defendants' contaminated facility received no damages.
Plaintiffs in the first two groups received an additional $12,000 for future medical monitoring expenses.
Lifley, 735 So. 2d at 699.
112. Id. at 702.
113. Id. at 706, citing Bourgeois v. A. P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 360 (La. 1998).




as fear of contraction and increased risk of disease. Although these claims are
more subjective and present multiple problems of proof, this result is probable for
two reasons. First, it will allow plaintiffs a form of recovery for the harm sustained
by the defendant's negligence. Second, it will promote the "deterrent function of
the tort system by compelling those who expose others to toxic substances to
minimize risks and costs of exposure."" 6 The potential for abuse in allowing
recovery for these damages certainly exists and should be avoided by the courts.
C. A Viable Solution
A more attractive interpretation of revised Article 2315 would be to construe
broadly "a manifest physical or mental injury or disease," thereby giving courts a
greater opportunity to award medical monitoring damages. In doing so, courts may
have to refine their definition of "disease or injury," at least in the toxic tort
context. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "injury" as "the invasion of
any legally protected interest of another."" 7 This definition seems to allow for a
broad interpretation of the revision to include damages other than actual, physical
harm to victims.
The "invasion" in these cases is the negligent, or possibly intentional, exposure
of victims to potentially harmful toxins. In some cases, this exposure causes some
degree of loss or detriment to victims in a form other than immediate, physical
harm. The injuries in these cases are often not traditional bruises, scrapes, or
fractures as seen in many personal injury cases.
The exposure itself, when accompanied by a reasonable showing of emotional
distress or anxiety, should be sufficient to qualify for an actionable injury under the
statute. These are real injuries, although they may not seem as such externally.
The difficulty lies in deciding if the exposure is "significant" enough, and if the
emotional distress is "genuine" enough, to justify medical monitoring damages.
This determination is a function of the court, which, with the aid of pre-trial
motions, can eliminate frivolous claims before litigation costs become too high.
This equitable solution would reap benefits for both victims of exposure and
negligent defendants. For victims, it satisfies the compensation and deterrence
goals of tort litigation. For defendants, it may actually limit the damage awards that
courts might be willing to grant plaintiffs for their emotional injuries, since other
options would exist. These options would consist of monetary compensation for
the medical costs actually incurred by plaintiffs. Instead of awarding lump-sum
damages to victims of exposure who do not yet present physical symptoms of
disease, courts could administer funds on a need-only basis to pay for the medical
costs of exposure victims. If they limit the interpretation of Article 2315, courts
may be forced into awarding speculative monetary damages for a subjective fear
of contraction of disease, or perhaps even an increased risk. By giving the revision
a broader interpretation, courts could recognize the same injuries that have been
116. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dept. of the Army. 696 A.2d 137. 145 (Pa. 1997).
117. Restatement (Second) of Torts §7 (1977).
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allowed under the old law and award medical monitoring to plaintiffs in place of
large, suspect monetary damages.
A sound approach for the courts of Louisiana to adopt when deciding these
cases consists of a two-step process. First, the court should look at the alleged
harm or injury to the victim. If the plaintiff can show a sufficient exposure along
with reasonable emotional distress, such a showing should be adequate to warrant
an exception to allow for the possibility of medical monitoring. Second, the court
should look to the criteria listed in Bourgeois to see if the plaintiff satisfies the
seven prerequisites listed. If so, then the court should consider granting recovery
for medical monitoring damages. "'
Under the new law, an award of medical monitoring costs should not be seen
as an alternative for courts in lieu of claims for fear of contraction of disease, or
possibly increased risk. The wording of the statute clearly intends to eliminate
medical monitoring as a separate theory of recovery under Louisiana law. Instead,
it is an alternative remedy for plaintiffs. In other words, courts can award damages
in the form of future medical costs to supplement or to replace monetary damages
in fear of contraction or increased risk cases. In light of the policy concerns
discussed above, courts should consider this option favorably when calculating the
appropriate damages for plaintiffs.
D. Putting the Solution to Work
Although it seems medical monitoring costs can still be recovered by Louisiana
plaintiffs, the possibility of making these awards may be suspect for several
practical reasons. Chief among them is the lack of incentive for plaintiffs to seek
medical monitoring costs under the new law, especially in light of the recent
changes to class action certification in Louisiana. In the past, medical monitoring
cases could be brought as class action suits without the need to prove any type of
present injury to the victims.' 9 These cases were attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys
for a very simple reason. Article 595 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
allows courts to award attorneys' fees when a recovery is made for the benefit of
the class. Louisiana court decisions addressing attorneys' fees in class actions
118. If theexposuredid lead to subsequent contraction of adisease or injury, the plaintiffgenerally
would be barred by res judicata from asserting a claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4232 (2000) does provide exceptions to this general rule. It states:
A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff:
(I) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the
judgment;
(2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or
(3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.
These exceptions allow for a plaintiff to "split the cause of action" over a period of time in cases like
those seen in toxic tort litigation. Therefore, a victim of exposure might be allowed to sue for medical
monitoring costs, and later sue again for the disease or illness contracted as a result of the exposure.
119. See, e.g., Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355 (La. 1998); Dragon v.
Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., Inc. (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999); Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725
So. 2d 10 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
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uniformly have awarded these fees by a percentage of the fund recovered. 20 This,
of course, would give attorneys an incentive to sign up as many potential class
members as possible in order to increase the size of the fund, and thereby increase
their fees if the class received any recovery.
Two events have occurred which may end this trend. First, the Louisiana
Legislature amended Civil Code article 2315 to require an actionable injury before
any surveillance costs could be recovered. This requirement will make it much
more difficult for attorneys to attain class status for large groups of exposed
persons under Article 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure, primarily because of
hardships in showing commonality of injury in exposure cases.' Differing levels
of exposure, time of exposure, type of injury, and possible exposure to other toxins
make it very troublesome for attorneys to find victims with similar symptoms to
fulfill the commonality requirement of Article 591 (A)(1). Another related problem
is the recent retreat by Louisiana courts from the practice of sanctioning class
actions in virtually any type of mass tort." ' In 1997, the Louisiana Legislature
passed an act which significantly modified the prior statutory class action design .'2
The new statutory language tracks the types of liability cases seen under Rule 23(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Also, it implicitly overruled the "err if
favor" presumption for class actions articulated by the Louisiana Supreme Court.'"
Aligning the Louisiana standard for granting class status with the federal law
may not bode well for toxic tort plaintiffs. The United States Supreme Court has
shown a growing resistance in recent years to recognize classes in mass tort cases.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court de-certified a settlement class
which sought to settle all unfiled present and future asbestos-related claims against
120. Donald C. Massey et al., Curtailing the Tidal Surge: Current Reforms in Louisiana Class
Action Law, 44 Loy. L Rev. 7. 75 (1998). For cases, see Bruno v. City of New Orleans, 639 So. 2d
1201 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 391 (1994) (addressing trial court award of attorneys'
fees and costs of twenty percent of judgment in class action); Pillow v. Board of Com'rs. 425 So. 2d
1267 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982)(affirming award of attorneys' fees of. one-third of judgment in suit
originally filed as class action but later amended to be individual action); Alexander v. lindsay. 152
So. 2d 261. 267 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963)("[An attorney's fee of 204b of the corporation's recovery
hereunder would be reasonable.").
121. La. Code Civ. P. art. 591(A) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of
all, only if:(i) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class.(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class.
(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.(5) The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of ascertainable criteria, such that the
court may determine the constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of any
judgment that may be rendered in the case.
122. Massey, upra note 120, at 58.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 62.
125. Id. This presumption was articulated in McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Sevices of La.
Inc., 456 So. 2d 612 (La. 1984).
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the defendants. 26  The Court's concerns included the lack of adequate
representation of all possible victims of exposure and the inadequacy of notice to
future claimants who were bound by the settlement." 7 The Court reiterated its
Amchem Products holding last year in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.' Once again,
the Court de-certified a settlement class action against a manufacturer of asbestos-
containing products.2 9 An overriding concern with the adequacy of representation
for all possible plaintiffs again was expressed, as well as the impracticality of
distributing the funds to the plaintiffs.'-' These two cases in particular may sound
as a warning to courts faced with class certification questions, especially those
jurisdictions utilizing procedural rules identical or similar to Federal Rule 23.
Louisiana appears to be such a jurisdiction after the legislative changes in 1997.
The first indication of the trend to scrutinize class actions more heavily in
Louisiana is seen in Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc.3' In Ford, the Louisiana
Supreme Court de-certified a class of residents from St. Bernard and Orleans
Parishes that alleged long-term exposure to emissions from oil refineries and other
facilities caused them injury.'32 In its opinion, the court held that "only mass torts
'arising from a common cause or disaster' may be appropriate for class
certification ..."' It relied heavily on the Amchem Products holding that mass
tort claims must comply strictly with the predominance test for common character
of claims.*'4
Putting this trend into the medical monitoring perspective, one can see the lack
of incentive for plaintiffs, or more specifically plaintiffs' attorneys, to bring a suit
in which medical monitoring expenses are sought. After Ford, there is a high
likelihood that courts will be unwilling to allow a class to be certified when the
injury alleged is only one of emotional distress from exposure. The issue of
commonality certainly seems to be a roadblock for attorneys trying to certify a class
under Article 591(A) of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Under the
rationale of Lilley and Ford, attorneys would be better served to sue for the
emotional distress from exposure through individual clients, without seeking class
status or medical monitoring as a form of recovery. A monetary sum for the
victim's emotional distress would ensure the attorney of his pro rata share under
a contingency fee contract without any assurance that the victim will get the proper
treatment necessary to expunge possible disease or injury resulting from the
exposure. Moreover, these claims will likely come as individual suits, leading to
126. 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
127. Id. at 617-22, 117 S.Ct. at 2246-2249.
128. 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
129. The court in Amctm Products was deciding the appropriateness of certification of a class
under Federal Rule 23(b)(3), whereas it using Rule 23(b)(I)(B) in Ortiz. Although each of these
provisions has different elements that plaintiffs must meet in order to by class certified, the policies in
doing so are almost identical. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856, 119 S. Ct. at 2319 n.31.
130. Ortiz, 527 U.S. 832, 119 S. Ct. at 2308.
131. 703 So. 2d 542 (La. 1997).
132. Id. at 543.




a litany of litigation which may cost defendants enormous amounts of money. This
is a possibility that should be avoided.
A solution to this problem will be difficult to formulate. A balance between
the policy concerns implicated in mass tort class actions, the need for medical
surveillance to abate disease in exposure victims, and the need for incentives for
attorneys to bring these suits must be struck. Until such a balance is met, the courts
should consider supplementing, or in some cases substituting, large monetary
awards in emotional distress claims due to exposure with medical monitoring costs
under some sort of voucher system The most effective way to accomplish this goal
is to establish court-supervised funds to pay for the victims' monitoring costs as
they are incurred. The utility of monitoring, as discussed above, is clearly
beneficial. However, simultaneously satisfying plaintiffs, defendants, and
attorneys in these cases is a monumental challenge which should be addressed by
appropriate legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
The choice to amend Civil Code article 2315 was clearly a policy decision by
the Louisiana Legislature to eliminate a pure medical monitoring theory of
recovery. However, the wording of the revision seems to allow courts to continue
to award medical monitoring damages-so long as they are linked to an actual injury.
Injuries under the new statute should include significant exposure which is
accompanied by reasonable emotional distress or anxiety caused by that exposure.
Limiting medical monitoring damages to persons who have actual, physical injuries
from their exposure defeats the purpose of medical surveillance. If medical
monitoring is used to detect the symptoms of exposure-related diseases, or find
them in their early development, it can mitigate the hazards caused by the exposure.
Restricting awards for medical monitoring to victims who have already contracted
a disease makes little, if any, sense. By that point, treatment is necessary.
Although the legislature explicitly cited Bourgeois in the act amending
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, one can perceive this citation as only excluding
a pure medical monitoring theory of recovery from exposure alone. There is a clear
exception allowing for the award of monitoring expenses that should be utilized by
the courts liberally. The alternatives are not attractive, and may lead to greater
expense on the part of defendants. Despite its shortcomings, the medical
monitoring standard announced by the court in Bourgeois does offer a manageable
solution that lends itself to modification if necessary. If the monitoring does
nothing other than ease the minds of victims, then it may be justified. As Chief
Justice Calogero stated in his concurring opinion in Bourgeois:
One thing that such a plaintiff might gain is certainty as to his fate,
whatever it may be. If a plaintiff has been placed at an increased risk for
a latent disease through exposure to a hazardous substance, absent
medical monitoring, he must live each day with the uncertainty of whether
the disease is present in his body. If, however, he is able to take
advantage of medical monitoring and the monitoring detects no evidence
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of the disease, then, at least for the time being, the plaintiff can receive the
comfort of peace of mind. . . . Certainly, these options should be
available to the innocent plaintiff who finds himself at an increased risk
for a serious latent disease through no fault of his own. 3
James E. Lapeze"
135. Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 363 (La. 1998).
* The author would like to give special thanks to Professor William R. Corbett for his
assistance and patience during the draffing of this article.
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